The Calmness Agreement Report - Continued - Gaza-West Bank Issues during the Calmness

Palestinian internal dialogue and reconciliation

Operations and declarations from both Fatah and Hamas were burying any possible or real opportunity for dialogue between them, and have increased the process of political and geographical separation between the Gaza Strip and The West Bank, thus delaying any future reconciliation between both parties, unless there is a powerful Arab intervention at the highest levels.

President Mahmoud Abbas announced during his visit to Cairo on 27/7/2008 the commencement of a dialogue for reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, to be managed by Egypt under the auspice of the Arab League in Cairo. Abbas announced the readiness of Fatah for unconditional dialogue and reconciliation on 5/6/2008 and he added from Cairo that all Palestinian factions were intivited to participate in such a dialogue, and he continued saying that he gave his instructions to release all Hamas activists on the West Bank. However, Hamas spokesperson Sami Abu Zuhri claimed that the initiative by President Mahmoud Abbas was not genuine, and was only started to cover the alleged bombings and other such acts carried out by Fatah in Gaza.
During an important meeting between King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Egyptian president Mubarak held in Egypt ( Alexandria) on 15/08/2008, most of the discussions and talks between the two leaders were addressed to the Palestinian internal conflict and the dialogue between Fatah and Hamas. (Al-Ahram newspaper 16/8/2008).

A meeting of Arab foreign ministers held at the Arab League in Cairo on 8/9/2008, attended by PA President Mahmoud Abbas, declared that the Arab League would create a new mechanism for the Palestinian dialogue (although it was proposed by Saudi Arabia) –AlHayat El-jadida London newspaper.
Egypt started a new round of talks with the (armed) Palestinian Factions, starting with Islamic Jihad on 24/8/2008, who came to Egypt with a delegation headed by leader Mr. Ramadn Shallah, in addition to other Jihad leaders from the Gaza Strip.

On 1/9/2008 Egypt separately prepared invitations to 6 other Palestinian factions (armed ones only – members of PLO) for a new stage of dialogue, discussing the best way to get Fatah and Hamas to the negotiating table (According to Al-Ahram daily news paper on 2/9/2008: A Palestinian high rank official stated that a meeting will be held between PA President Mahmoud Abbas and Khaled Masha’al – Head of Hamas political bureau – in Cairo after the feast which comes after Ramadan). Hamas leader Dr. Khalil El-Hayya confirmed on 9/9/2008 (according to Hamas web-site: Palestine Now) that Egypt will invite both Fatah and Hamas to Cairo for separate and individual negotiations with each side.

The Fatah delegation already met with the Egyptian side on 20/9/2008 and came back to Gaza after having dense negotiations on the Egyptian Road Plan for Palestinian reconciliation.
It was said that the Hamas delegation would meet the Egyptian side on 7/10/2008, so that, by then, Egypt could sum-up the results of the meetings with all Palestinian factions. On the eve of such negotiations, Khaled Masha’al, who attended a gathering in Damascus on 13/9/2008, stated that Hamas would not consider President Mahmoud Abbas as the President of PA, unless he would be reelected after 9/1/2008. In the meantime he delegitimized the executive committee of PLO, claiming that this committee was not elected by the Palestinians (Al-Jazeera TV and others on 14/9/2008).

Following Khaled Mash'al's statement, and during a gathering for Iftar (the sunset main meal in Ramadan) at Al-Jazeera hotel in Gaza on 14/9/2008, vice-PLC chairman Dr. Ahmed Bahar stated in front of all Hamas officials, including Ismail Haniya and other civil society leaders, that he, PLC members and Hamas would never recognize any decree from President Mahmoud Abbas to terminate the period of the present PLC (President Mahmoud Abbas had asked for early elections for the Presidency and PLC at the same time) Dr. Bahar agreed on Presidency elections after 9/1/2008 and insisted on the legitimacy of the present PLC, and added that elections would be carried out at the end of the PLC's legal period, which ends on 25/1/2010.

On 20/9/2008, Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoom, in a press statement stated that Hamas agreed on the formation of a national unity government to settle the political crisis which had divided the Palestinians. "Hamas prefers a national coalition that can defend the Palestinian people and their rights," said Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoom in Gaza.

Prime Minister of the Deposed Government, Ismail Haniyyah, claimed in a press statement on 24/9/2008 that "the way to National Dialogue is blocked as there are no real signs of its seriousness.

Haniyyah claimed that in the light of bombings, strikes, preventing passports to be transported from Ramallah to Gaza, and in the presence of plans to announce Gaza Strip as a rebel territory, there will be no opening for dialogue.
He added that Hamas would not opt for dialogue in such an atmosphere. While the others are asking for dialogue, they stab us in the back. He also added that the Palestinians in Gaza are on their way to break the closure.

As a response to the statements made by high ranking Hamas leaders, Fatah leaders considered Hamas to thwart the dialogue before it had started, putting all the responsibility on Hamas.

According to a Hamas website (www.paltimes.net), in an unexpected declaration, Prime Minister Ismail Haneyyah confirmed the devotion of his government as well as the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) on the Palestinian-Palestinian dialogue, stressing that the Palestinian government created the environment for the success of the dialogue.

This came during the Eid (Feast) morning prayer on Tuesday 30/9/2008, in the Palestine football stadium, where the Prime Minister guided (Imam) thousands of citizens praying in the open air. Haneyyah said: "We will go to the Cairo dialogue with open minds and hands extended for a consensus and unity.” The Hamas delegation left to meet in Cairo with General Omer Suliman, Egyptian Minister of Intelligence and other officials, as they left Gaza through Rafah border crossing on Tuesday 7/10/2008. They were the last Palestinian faction to meet with the Egyptian officials. The Gaza members were headed by Dr. Mahmoud Zahhar and the diaspora members by Musa AbuMarzouk, deputy chairman of the Hamas political bureau. Israel refused to permit Hamas members from the West Bank to leave via the King Hussein Bridge to Amman and thus could not join the delegation.

Hamas leader Dr. Mahmoud Zahhar, when interviewed by the BBC-Arabic section on 9/10/2008, said that he was optimistic after a positive meeting between the Hamas delegation and the Egyptian officials, where they discussed the Egyptian plan for Palestinian internal dialogue and reconciliation. Dr. Zahhar added that they began to study the formation of committees with Fatah and other factions to discuss all issues required.

According to Firas information agency (www.fpnp.net) Mahmoud Zahhar said Friday 10/10/2008 that it had been agreed between his movement and the Egyptians to form a Unity National Government for reconciliation, and that they also discussed a rearrangement of the security services on the West Bank and in Gaza, taking the same measures in both areas. Zahhar said: “all the points raised in our acquaintance have been agreed upon as subjects of political partnership, reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and Gaza and agreed on a national unity government.”

Zahar also said that it had been agreed with the Egyptians to meet again on 25/10/2008. This meeting had been postponed to 9/11/2008, in order to include all Palestinian factions, as requested by Fatah leaders, who refused to negotiate alone with Hamas.

All Palestinian factions came out with an Egyptian Road Map for Palestinian National reconciliation, supported by the Arab league and the majority of Arab countries, headed by Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

It should be noted that in recent times it could be noticed that Arab leaders and the Arab league started to attach more weight and importance to the Palestinian internal conflict. Secretary General of the Arab League Amro Musa told the delegation of PFLP, whom he met in Cairo on 1/9/2008, that in case of there being no dialogue between Fatah and Hamas within the coming 2-3 months, the Arab league might impose a solution to the crisis, explaining to Palestinians and others which party was being the obstacle (according to www.Palpress.ps on 2/9/2008).

Egypt, in full support of the Arab league, is finalizing a new plan to regulate the situation in the Gaza Strip, called "Elaboration of a comprehensive Egyptian package". The main items in the Egyptian plan are:
1. Formating of a Palestinian national unity government
2. Opening of the Rafah crossing and the lifting of the siege on Gaza
3. Resuming of the Calmness and preventing the launch of rockets at Israeli territory
4. Releasing Gila'ad Shalit in exchange for the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners (Hamas' request is to free 1000 prisoners) .
5. Sending a military force consisting of members from several Arab countries (mainly from Egypt and Jordan) to control the border crossings in the Gaza Strip.

On the other hand, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, AbuEl-Gheit, proposed to send Arab soldiers (3000) to maintain security in Gaza. Hamas refused the second proposal claiming that there is no need for Arab soldiers to maintain security, while Gaza people are living in full security under the Hamas forces, adding that Hamas would welcome any Arab soldiers to fight the Israeli occupation and free Jerusalem and the holy Al-Aqsa mosque.

Somewhat later, Cairo initiated contact with the Palestinian factions in an effort to implement the Comprehensive Egyptian package (According to Maareev, Israeli newspaper on 25/9/2008 and other media reports)

According to (www.Palpress.PS- close to Fatah of 6/10/2008) "Okaz Saudi Arabia newspaper" published the details of the Egyptian initiative, which consisted of 14 items aimed at bridging the Palestinian separation caused by the Hamas take over in June 2007 as a prelude for launching a comprehensive national dialogue. It was added that Hamas had rejected 3 items of the initiative and agreed on the other 11 items.

The newspaper pointed out that the initiative in some points reflected the Mecca agreement and the Yemeni initiative. The following are items of the initiative accepted by Hamas as published by the Saudi paper:

1. Stop all forms of inflammatory media campaigns.
2. The release of all prisoners from Hamas and Fatah at one time under the aegis of an Arab committee
3. To allow the return of citizens who left the Gaza Strip through force without arresting them.
4. The abolition of the ban on a number of associations and institutions on the West Bank and in Gaza.
5. To maintain temporary control of policing by the neutral Arab committee.
6. Commitment to identifying and legitimizing the PLO representation to all segments of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, to start the reform and restructuring of the PLO (when the dialogue starts), which are to be completed within four months, with the adoption of measures, general elections and the rate figures of representation in the institutions of the PLO.
7. Hamas movement is to vacate its presence, its institutions, and the headquarters in the Gaza Strip, including political, and security ones, and return these sites to the legitimate authority.
8. Freeze the work of the existing Executive Force, which belongs to Hamas.
9. Formation of a transitional government to prepare for legislative and presidential elections before March 2009, based on the commitment to the program of the Palestine Liberation Organization PLO.
10. The commitment of the factions on the negotiated political solution. In case of failure of this option, the factions will be consulted, in order to adopt and pursue another option.
11. Invite all factions to join the institutions of the PA, implying their commitment to PA policy, and in the meantime giving the right to oppose peacefully to political parties outside the framework of the PA.

The items that were rejected by Hamas:
12. The Arab security team to be led by Egypt for the supervision of the arrangement and resolving contentious issues relating to security institutions.
13. Sending an Egyptian-led Arab force of 3000 persons to the Gaza Strip to contribute to maintain security.
14. The commitment of all factions to international agreements signed by PA and committed by Fatah.

After the visit of President Abbas to Syria on 12/10/2008, some less encouraging statements were made :
- President Abbas refused to negotiate with the Hamas delegation on 25/10/2008 in Cairo, although he agreed before
- Hamas (as stated by Haneyya on Friday 17/10/2008) accused the PA on the West Bank with severe accusations, such as “traitors, collaborators with Israel, being supported by the Americans and Zionism, interrogating Islamic women on the West Bank in a bad manner ….etc”
It seemed that the gap between Fatah and Hamas was getting wider. The relations between Hamas and Egypt became more critical, and there were big doubts if the date of 25/10/2008 would see Fatah and Hamas together, unless there would be large pressure on both.

The meeting which was planned for Palestinian dialogue and reconciliation in Cairo on 9/11/2008 was postponed again, to 11/11/2008, but Hamas and other Palestinian factions close to Syria stated on 8/11/2008 that they would not attend the conference, accusing PA president Abbas for imprisoning Hamas leaders and activists on the West bank, stating that he was to bear all responsibilities which canceled the conference.

On Sunday 23/11/2008 Hamas had mobilized a large conference in Damascus called “Right of Return”, sponsored by Syria with a distinguished presence of Iran.

At this conference the attendees attacked the Palestine Liberation Organization PLO and president Mahmoud Abbas, and also condemned the Palestinian Authority. They furthermore placed the responsibility of the siege on Gaza with the Arab countries, Egypt in particular, which, they claimed, was responsible for the closure of the Rafah crossing and the severe suffering of 1.5 million people in the Gaza Strip.
The purpose of the conference was to announce the following :
• To demonstrate to the Palestine Liberation Organization that it is no longer represented the Palestinian people
• To Delegitimize the present Palestinian National Council.
• To show that the Palestinian Authority was severely corrupted, and had become a burden on the Palestinians. Therefore it had to be disposed of, especially because it had become a puppet of Israel.

Hamas "issued an official memorandum explaining their reasons for the Cairo dialogue Failure, ( See Annex II)

The Islamic Resistance Movement "Hamas" issued an official memorandum, explaining in detail its position on Palestinian dialogue, which was scheduled to be held in Cairo on the 11th, of November 2008.

In the memorandum, received by "the Palestinian Information Center," the movement declared its position regarding the dialogue and reconciliation, and assured its willingness to cooperate with the efforts of the brothers in Egypt and the Arabs, in order to end the state of division and achieve national reconciliation through a serious national Palestinian dialogue which will have the real and basic requirements, equitable for all.

The memorandum pointed to contacts between the leadership of the movement and the Egyptian leadership, in a failed attempt to overcome the obstacles before the dialogue, which forced the movement after consultation with leaders of Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front (PFLP-GC), and Sa'eqa of Syria to inform the Egyptian leadership the position of the four factions, which was to not take part in the dialogue.

"Hamas" signaled that the memorandum was distributed to many countries and organizations, forces and factions on the Palestinian, Arab, Islamic and international levels.
Hamas attached to the memorandum a file of 616 names of detainees and abducted people in the prisons of PA in the West Bank, including students, workers, journalists, teachers, imams in mosques, PLC members, doctors, engineers, lawyers. The statement also illustrated the attacks on movement by the Fatah security services and armed wing.

In its memorandum Hamas did not mention the situation of Fatah activist in the Gaza Strip, and also never talked about the observations and criticism on its regime in Gaza from local as well as international Human Rights institutions.

The Calmness Agreement Report - Continued - Hamas and the Presidential Elections

Hamas and the Presidential elections

It is well known that President Mahmoud Abbas' PA presidency period expires on 9/1/2009, unless this period is extended for one year, according to the legal explanation of the head of the legal and legislative bureau in Ramallah, AbdelKareem AbuSalah (on 23/6/2008), to match with the date of the PLC elections on 25/1/2010, and thus to have the elections of the presidency and PLC simultaneously.

Ahmed Bahar (vice chairman of the PLC) rejected this explanation, according to the Hamas head of the legal and legislative bureau, Mohammed Aabed (on 24/6/2008). Mr. Bahar considered the explanation of Mr. AbdelKareem AbuSalah illegal and he declared that Hamas would not consider AbuMazen as the president of PA after the date of 9/1/2009, adding that in case of there being no presidential elections before that date, the Chairman of the PLC should take the place of the PA President for 60 days, according to the constitution, and presidential elections should take place after that. Being the vice chairman of PLC, Ahmed Bahar considered himself in that case the new president, while the Chairman Dr. Aziz Dwaik was still imprisoned by Israel. Dr. Ahmed Bahar also declared that Hamas would delegitimize AbuMazen as the PA president after the end of his period, and would not accept his decrees and orders in the PA, especially in the Gaza Strip, as long as the situation of disputes and separation between Gaza and West Bank continued.

Egypt, with the full support of the Arab league, was doing its best to succeed in its efforts to having a fruitful dialogue and accord between Fatah and Hamas before 9/1/2009, to avoid any further disputes and continuing political as well as geographic separation between the West bank and Gaza.

It seemed that Hamas was delaying any dialogue and reconciliation with Fatah in order to gain more power, by occupying the PA President position, while according to the constitution the present President and PLC should announce new presidential elections 3 months prior to the planned date, i.e. President Mahmoud Abbass should have announced new elections on 9/10/2008. Hamas thus assumed to be in a stronger position with control of the Gaza Strip and the PA Presidency in any upcoming negotiations with Fatah.

Israel considered that when the PA president would be from Hamas after 9/1/2009, they may use force against Hamas (Debka web-site on 8/9/2008).

On the eve of the departure of the Hamas delegation for the dialogue with the Egyptian officials, the PLC in Gaza held a special session on 6/10/2008, which was attended by Hamas members only, supported with letters of attorneys from their colleagues from the West Bank, and others in the Israeli jails. A statement was published after the session declaring the following :
• The PLC will not give a mandate to PA President Mahmoud Abbas after 9/1/2009, after spending 4 years in this position. following the Palestinian basic law (constitution).
• The PLC will never accept early elections for the PLC. It should continue until 25/1/2010.
After the closing of the session and in an interview with BBC-Arabic TV, Dr. Ahmed Bahar declared that on the eve of 9/1/2009, the PLC will appoint the chairman of the PLC, Aziz Dwaik (who is imprisoned by Israel), if freed, or his deputy Dr. Ahmed Bahar as the PA president for 60 days before launching new presidential elections. Furthermore, the PLC will prolong this period if the situation in Palestinian Territories permits that.

It is worth mentioning that according to the Haaretz news paper of 30/11/2008, Israel will free most of the Hamas PLC imprisoned members within the next year 2009.

On Sunday 23/11/2008, the Palestinian Central Council, at its meeting held in Ramallah, had unanimously elected Mahmoud Abbas as the president of the State of Palestine, to be the successor of the late President Yasser Arafat, who was elected on 30/3/1989 as president (which was declared in the Algeria conference on November 1988). This post has remained vacant since the death of President Arafat In November 2004.

Credible Palestinian sources said that Abbas intended to organize presidential and legislative elections in April 2009 and would make an announcement in a presidential decree to be issued soon.

The London daily Al-Hayat quoted these sources as saying that Abbas discussed the elections at the end of his term with a number of Arab leaders, including Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and vowed to not run for a second term, adding that he wanted to deliver the position to the newly elected President. Palestinian sources indicated that countries such as Syria advised him to organize elections in August or September 2009, but President Abbas decided to organize it in April and issue a presidential decree as soon as possible, as confirmed by the Palestinian presidential spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeina.

The Calmness Agreement Report - Continued - Gaza-Israeli Issues during the Calmness

Gaza-Israeli crossings

The Calmness Agreement stipulated that the border crossings would be opened fully to allow for the transportation of fuel and raw materials needed for construction and industry, 10 days after the commencement the agreement.

80 days after the beginning of Calmness, Israel had only increased foodstuffs and petroleum derivatives around 10%, compared to the amounts transported before the Calmness Agreement . Also Israel had allowed the transport of garments, school uniforms and shoes provided that they were imported through Israeli dealers or manufactured in Israel, to ensure the continuation of the closure of local factories in Gaza and the continuation of the high rate of unemployment (Since the closure Israel didn't allow the transport of any goods manufactured in the West Bank except for some dairy products).

In the light of the ongoing Calmness in the Gaza Strip, Israel was still applying counter-effective actions affecting the peace negotiations taking place between the Palestinian National Authority and Israel, particularly by the continuous detention of Palestinian activists on the West Bank, and continuous settlements extensions, especially in East Jerusalem.
From time to time all Gaza crossings were closed, sometimes with a reason, sometimes without. Certainly they were closed every time there were rockets launched on Israel, however, regardless of the suffering of 1.5 million Palestinians living in Gaza Strip.

The most difficult and harsh closing of the crossings since the commencement of the Calmness Agreement, was in November 2008, when Israel closed the borders from 4/11/2008 onwards, as a result of rockets launched on the Israeli southern cities and towns as a response to an Israeli attack in the middle area of the Gaza Strip and killing Palestinian fighters in Rafah.

After one month of such a long closure, one could only imagine what type of life the people of Gaza were living, with severe food shortages, especially for about 800000 people who were getting their food share through UNRWA, being refugees.

Amira Hass an Israeli journalist who came from Cyprus on 8/11/2008 with a group of human rights activists to break through the siege, lived about three weeks in Gaza before being deported by Hamas security services on 1/12/2008. She wrote an article in Ha'aretz (12/12/2008) which described the status of 1.5 million Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip. Amira Hass explained the difficulties UNRWA faced with transporting very simple items for Gaza schools and pupils, in addition to problems transporting distilled water for medical laboratories, medicines for diabetes patients and children who suffered from heart diseases, vitamin A, and testing kits for pregnancy tests, classifying blood types and diagnosing diabetes. (The full article can be found in annex number 1.)

On 12/12/2008, it was expected that Israel would continue transporting foodstuffs and animal food to Gaza for the 3rd day, but Israel in a sudden act closed the Karni (Montar) terminal for undisclosed reasons, after only 8 out of 43 trucks were able to unload their goods in Gaza.

Gaza-Egypt crossing: Rafah

President Mahmoud Abbas and the Prime Minister of the interim government Dr. Salam Fayyadh supported the Calmness Agreement between Hamas and Israel in order to alleviate the Palestinian people in Gaza and to open the closed commercial crossings in order to lift the siege. A high ranking official stated in a closed meeting with Palestinian business men abroad, that the PA position was rejecting the full opening of the border crossings and the re-opening of Rafah passengers crossing without the full presence of the Presidential PA guards there. This coincided with the Egyptian policy, while the opening of crossings, especially Rafah, would strengthen the position of the Hamas regime and improve its popularity among the citizens in the Gaza Strip, at a time when the popularity was very low. It had declined to the extent that Dr. Ahmed Youssef (adviser to the Hamas PM Haneyyah) stated on 15/7/2008 in Al-Quds daily newspaper that the rupture between Palestinian people in Gaza had worsened in such a way that the owners of solace houses who were not affiliated Hamas, refused to receive Hamas members for offering their condolences and sympathy.

According to the Kuwaiti Al-Qabas newspaper on 3/9/2008, the Egyptian authorities decided to open Rafah crossing from time to time to minimize the suffering of the Palestinians. If so, this was probably done while the Egyptian authorities didn’t want to have another Palestinian incursion of the border like the one that occurred on 23/1/2008.

Rafah crossing was opened especially for the leaders of Hamas, patients, and others:

• On 11/7/2008 the crossing had been opened for the arrival of Hamas leader AbuHashim with his escort only from Egypt.
• On 12/7/2008 the crossing had been opened for the arrival of Hamas leader Dr. Zahhar with his escort only from Egypt.
• On 14/7/2008 the crossing had been opened for 17 Palestinian football team leaving to Jordan to participate in The Asian Football Championship.
• On 15/7/2008 the crossing had been opened for the arrival of 11 patients and citizens who were in Egypt for long time.
• On the occasion of Ramadan and for fear of another incursion of the Egyptian borders, the Egyptian authorities opened the Rafah border crossing for 2 days (31/8/2008 and 1/9/2008), from both sides. About 5000 persons benefited of this step, whether they were Palestinians stuck in Egypt or Egyptians stuck in Gaza (Al-Ahram newspaper on 2/9/2008), in addition to Palestinian students, patients, and others who had a valid permit of residence in different countries.
• Egypt opened the crossing on 20-21/9/2008 for Palestinians of certain categories: about 1000 pilgrims on their way to Saudi Arabia, students who were registered at universities abroad, patients, persons who had valid permits of residency in other countries, and one international activist who had been stuck in Gaza since 23/8/2008 (the sister of Tony Blair's wife).
• Egypt opened the crossing on 6-7/10/2008 for the return back to Gaza for the pilgrims and patients only (one way), followed by a partial opening to continue the return of these two groups only.
• During October the crossing was almost opened every couple of days for the return of Pilgrims and patients only. However also for Hamas delegation members, who came back to Gaza through Rafah crossing on 25/10/2008.
• From 4/11/2008 onwards the Rafah border crossing was opened for 3 days, of which about 4000 benefited, leaving Gaza or coming back.
• During the first week of November the crossing was opened for the Palestinian faction representatives who attended the Cairo dialogue.
• On 12/11/2008 the crossing was opened for the return of faction representatives, after the failure of the Cairo dialogue and reconciliation conference.
• From 29/11/2008 onwards, the crossing was opened for 3 days for the Pilgrims of Gaza to leave for Saudi Arabia, but Hamas security services didn't permit 3100 Pilgrims to leave Gaza, because they were registered by the PA in Ramallah, and because the Saudi government didn't apply visas for the Pilgrims that were registered by Hamas deposed government.

On 10/9/2008 a group of Egyptian parliament members (opposition and Muslim brotherhood members) arranged a symbolic popular campaign to break through the closure on Gaza Strip. They wanted to arrive at Rafah borders accompanied with Food and Health supplies addressed to the Palestinians in Gaza. The Egyptian authorities stopped the participants of this campaign at Isma’eleia City (more than 250km from Rafah). The participants dispersed peacefully after having a press conference, accusing the Egyptian Government of assisting the closure on the Gaza Strip.

Fawzi Barhoom, Hamas spokesperson, stated on 11/9/2008 that Hamas highly valued such campaigns, and asked the Arab and other international communities to do the same. In the mean time he added that Hamas felt sorry for the action of the Egyptian Government to stop this campaign, preventing it from reaching Rafah.

On 6/10/2008, the anniversary of the 1973 war between Egypt and Israel, a new group of Egyptian parliament members from the opposition (mainly from the Muslim Brotherhood), journalists, doctors, and others arranged a new campaign to come to Rafah during the scheduled opening of the crossing for pilgrims coming back from Mecca. Hundreds of Egyptian security forces stopped the participants leaving from Cairo, forcing them to disperse in Cairo itself. Others who arrived at Al-Arish City were asked to go back. The participants again accused the Egyptian regime for playing a major role in the closure on the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, together with Israel.

In a new press statement on 22/10/2008, the European campaign To End The Siege on Gaza said they were preparing a new campaign to try breaking through the borders of Rafah. The campaign spokesman added that Arab parliament members (from Algeria, Kuwait, Yemen, Jordan, Sudan) would join the campaign in addition to the European delegation.

Yousi Belin, Head of the Israeli Meretz party, declared after his meeting with Omer Suliman, Egyptian Minister of Intelligence, that Egypt informed Hamas leaders it would consider normal relations with Hamas when finalizing the Israeli captive soldier issue (Voice of Israel 8/9/2008 at 8:05am).

It is worth mentioning that due to the closure of Gaza border crossings and especially Rafah, the number of smuggling tunnels near the Rafah borders approached 1100 (there is no official number) along the whole border, which is about 14km long. This means that there were about 80 tunnels per one kilometer - one tunnel every 12.5 meters. These tunnels were used to bring from Egypt materials and goods not allowed by Israel to be transported to Gaza. But the costs of these materials were very high compared to the prices on the West Bank or Israel.

Later on, Egypt started using new USA technology to find these tunnels and demolish them, fearing the smuggling of explosives and weapons to Hamas, who were controlling the majority of these tunnels, issuing licenses for excavating tunnels.

Some Palestinians were killed due to the collapse of tunnels (Egyptian Authorities and others claimed that about 140 tunnels had been closed from the Egyptian side). In some cases the tunnels collapsed due to the crossing of tunnels during the excavation. A group of people who formed a new gathering called “the families of tunnel victims” declared in press statements that they accused Egypt for the killing of their sons. They claimed that up to 28/9/2008 (press statement by the group on 28/9/2008), the number of victims since 1/1/2008 in tunnels collapses reached 45.

Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot revealed on Thursday morning 2/10/2008 that US soldiers in civilian dress were working in full cooperation with the Egyptian soldiers to discover tunnels used for smuggling arms along the Philadelphi route between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.

According to the paper, in September 2008 they discovered an unprecedented number of 42 tunnels. The newspaper said that the tunnels were discovered due to the secret U.S. technology and American engineering experts.

The deployment of US troops was agreed upon during a visit by Defense Minister Ehud Barak to Cairo more than half a year ago. The Israeli daily also said that "intensive activity increased the tension between Egypt and Hamas (Translated from www.Qudsnet.com/arabic of 3/10/2008 and Al-Quds daily newspaper).

The Calmness Agreement Report - Continued - Exchange of prisoners process

Exchange of prisoners process

On 16/7/2008 Israel and Hezbollah exchanged prisoners. Israel released 5 Lebanese prisoners, including Samir Kuntar who was sentenced to life in Israel, having spent in Israeli jails around 30 years, in addition to 199 Lebanese, Arab, and Palestinian corpses. In return Hezbollah returned the two corpses of Israeli soldiers who were captured on 12/7/2006 in a military operation by Hezbollah. The action which led to the second Lebanese war.

The exchange of prisoners benefited the Hamas movement and emphasized its adherence to the conditions for the release of the Israeli captive soldier Gilaad Shalit who had been captured on 25/6/2006, especially where it concerned the indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israeli representatives which took place in Cairo, mediated by Egypt. In the light of the Calmness, Hamas was trying to achieve an exchange of prisoners, similar to the one made by Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Hamas also wanted to prolong the time of the negotiations regarding the release of the captive Israeli soldier to guarantee Israeli would not assault the movement, its centers, and its activists, including Hamas leaders.

Al-Quds AlArabi, a newspaper based in London, wrote on Thursday 21/8/2008 that Egypt warned Hamas leaders to be aware of Israeli attempts to target them in case no progress was being made in the indirect negotiations to free the Israeli captive soldier Shalit, against the freeing of about 1000 Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. Out of these 1000, Hamas would select 450 prisoners (many of whom had spent dozens of years in Israeli jails, including prisoners who were indicted of killing or injured Israelis), and the other 550 prisoners were to be selected by Israel. The first response from Israel was that they agreed on 70 names of the Hamas list only, which led to a deadlock of the negotiations.

According to the Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv of 9/9/2008, Israel prepared a new list for the 450 prisoners to be freed by Israel, threatening to halt the Calmness Agreement, and to start targeting Hamas leaders, fighters, and centers, in case Hamas would disagree with their list. The newspaper added that according to an Egyptian official, Hamas was insisting that the opening of the Rafah crossing border should be part of the prisoners exchange process, while Israel completely rejected such a condition.

According to the Ha’aretz of 19/9/2008, Hamas would not renew negotiations for the release of the abducted soldier Gila'ad Shalit unless Israel would meet its preconditions, the London-based newspaper Asharq Alawsat quoted a senior official of the Islamist group.

According to the report, Hamas laid out three conditions for the renewal of negotiations with Israel:
• Release of all Palestinian prisoners whose names appear on the list that had been given to Israel via Egyptian mediators.
• Implementation of all Israeli commitments in the framework of the ceasefire Agreement, including the reopening of Gaza Strip crossings for transporting all types of goods.
• The opening of the Rafah crossing.
The newspaper further stated that Ofer Dekel, Israel's chief negotiator for securing the release of Shalit, had transferred an Egyptian-brokered list to Hamas of the 450 Palestinian prisoners that Israel would be willing to release in exchange for Shalit.

According to an interview with BBC Arabic section, Hamas leader Dr. Mahmoud Zahhar, stated on 20/9/2008 that in case Israel would not accept the conditions agreed upon with Egypt through one year of negotiations, especially regarding the list of 450 prisoners Hamas asked to release and the total number of prisoners to be released, it meant that negotiations would have to start again from point zero.

On 24/9/2008 an Israeli official said that Israel was reviewing the Hamas list of prisoners (450) to be freed and found that Israel could accept releasing half of the list.

However, the Hamas official stated his organization's insistence on the original list of names, which included prisoners serving lengthy prison terms, members of the Hamas parliament, as well as women and children.

Hamas also demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners held in Egypt, according to the report. "It doesn't make any sense that Egypt will moderate our prisoner exchange talks with Israel while it imprisons our members," the official said (Ha’aretz).

The ministerial Israeli team involved in the prisoners exchange (headed by vice PM Haim Ramon) met on 25/9/2008 to discuss the list of Palestinian prisoners to be freed in exchange with Gila'ad Shalit.

The team discussed the new criteria to be set by the Israeli government for the release of Palestinian prisoners, and would submit their recommendations, which were to be discussed and approved by the Israeli cabinet (according to Voice of Israel on 25/9/2008).

On 25/8/2008 Israel freed 198 Palestinian prisoners, non of them belonging to Hamas, as a gesture to President Abbas. Among them were 2 prisoners who were sentenced to life in prison and stayed about 30 years in Israeli jails, being accused by Israel of the killing of Israelis or their participation thereof. It was the first time that Israel released Palestinian prisoners accused of killing Israelis – with Israeli blood on their hands.

This could be considered as a very important precedent, to be repeated in the prisoners exchange, now indirectly going on (through Egypt) between Hamas and Israel.

On 3/9/2008 Dr. Mahmoud Al-Zahhar stated that Hamas stopped the negotiations with Israel through Egypt for prisoners exchange, claiming that Egypt and Israel continued closing the Gaza border crossings, especially Rafah.

On 4/9/2008, after a press conference at the end of the Quartet summit held in Damascus, including Syrian President Bashar Asaad, French President Sarkozy, the Prince of Qatar, and the PM of Turkey Rajab Ardogan, it was declared that the leaders concentrated on the peace process in the Middle East and the respective situations in Lebanon, Iraq and Darfur, in addition to the nuclear aspirations of Iran and the new problems in the Caucasus (as published in Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram on 5/9/2008).

President Sarkozy handed a letter from the Israeli captive soldier's parents to the prince of Qatar who promised to hand it to Khalid Masha'al, who in turn assured that the message would be handed to "Gilaad Shalit", who in fact had a dual nationality (French and Israeli). On 23/10/2008 Hamas leader Ayman Taha stated that the message was delivered to Shalit, while it was a humanitarian issue. He added that Hamas would not accept any further exchange of messages between Shalit and his family in the present stage of negotiations on prisoners exchange.

Due to the success of sending of the message, however, rumors began to spread that Hamas was considering to transfer the prisoner exchange negotiations process from Egypt to Qatar. The Palestinian newspaper Al-quds of 8/9/2008 published a statement of Hamas leader Dr.Ismael Radwan, denying such rumors and confirming that there was no conflict between Hamas and Egypt. He also added that the Shalit negotiations would be kept in Egypt, but Hamas was not in a hurry to finalize it before the full reopening of all Gaza border crossings and an end to the Gaza closure.

Osama Muzzaini, a Hamas leader responsible for the prisoners negotiations process, reaffirmed on 6/10/2008, that Hamas was not in a hurry with the prisoners exchange process, adding that the lack of progress in the process was due to the weakness of the Israeli government. He assumed that the indirect negotiations on the case would be restored after the formation of a new Israeli government.

Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff wrote in Haaretz on 7/10/2008, quoting Israeli security officials, “time running out on Shalit deal.”

The officials told Ha'aretz that the more time passed, the more things could go wrong and the greater the danger was that an opportunity would be missed to bring Shalit home.
The officials said they believed Hamas would raise the price for Shalit as time went by. A security official also said: "Many possibilities must be taken into account, not all of them under our control. The calm in the Gaza Strip could blow up, the Egyptians could reduce their involvement in the talks to concentrate on domestic issues, and one of Gila'ad's guards could harm him. There could even be complications from a flu that they don't know how to treat properly at Shifa," the official said, referring to a Gaza Strip hospital.

Officials said that as far as they know, no options existed for a military option to free Shalit. Referring to the kidnapping, an official said, "there was a failure, and now the price has to be paid, even if it means releasing terrorists who are murderers."

Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi represent the same position, believing that time is of the essence and that Israel should be taking advantage of the ongoing cease-fire in the Gaza Strip to move ahead on a deal to release Shalit, even at a "heavy cost."

Barak said Monday 6/10/2008 at a memorial service for the Armored Corps dead, at Latrun: "We will do everything possible and appropriate to bring Gila'ad Shalit home. We will spare no efforts. That is our duty."

Barak Ravid Israeli reporter from Ha'aretz wrote on 10/10/2008 that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has said in private conversations in recent weeks that it is a mistake to link the issue of kidnapped soldier Gila'ad Shalit's release to the cease-fire in the Gaza Strip.

PM Ihud Olmert has told officials in meetings on the matter that Israel must choose between moving ahead on Shalit's release by applying massive pressure on Hamas - which might lead to the breakdown of the cease-fire and a renewal of Qassam fire on the Negev - and a freeze on the Shalit release and quiet in Sderot and the communities close to the Gaza Strip. Sources close to Olmert have said that as long as things are quiet, Hamas has no interest in moving ahead on releasing Shalit.

According to the Al-Khayyat (an Arabic London based newspaper) of 13/10/2008, Ofer Dekel, the Israeli official dealing with the prisoners exchange, met with the Egyptian officials, and agreed to restore the indirect negotiations with Hamas from the point they had reached before, and thus not to start from scratch.

As mentioned in the beginning of this item regarding the exchange of prisoners, Avi Issacharoff wrote in Ha’aretz on 13/10/2008 that Hamas had raised the price for Shalit in the wake of the Israeli deal with Lebanon on Samir Kuntar from Hezbollah.

Negotiators involved in the talks over Shalit said Israel would have to change its criteria regarding the Palestinian prisoners it was willing to release. These sources said Hamas insisted that Israel would agree to release prisoners "with blood on their hands”. They said Hamas had raised its demands, arguing that Israel had already released Samir Kuntar, who was convicted of killing four Israelis in a 1979 terror attack in Nahariya, and two prisoners of the same category, Abu Ali Yatta and Sa'id al-Ataba, as a gesture to the Palestinian Authority. Hamas wanted Israel to agree to this same principle in order to renew the talks.

On 28/11/008, according to (Voice of Israel) Ofer Dekel, Israel's chief negotiator for securing the release of Shalit, went to Cairo to accelerate the exchange process with the Egyptian side, while the Egyptians asked Hamas to send a delegation to restore the negotiations regarding this issue. Hamas agreed.

It is not always possible to bring every soldier home, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told students at Tel Aviv's Tichon Hadash high school on Thursday 11/12/2008 (Haaretz 12/12/2008), as a message to Hamas. At the same time she also opposed the idea that Israel should pay " any price" to free Shalit.

In response to Livni's comments, Shas chairman and Industry Minister Eli Yishai declared that in his view, the time had in fact come to pay "any price" for Shalit.

Hamas minister Mahmoud Al-Zahhar, interviewed on Israel Radio on 11/12/2008, insisted that a "serious" Israeli government could close a deal for Shalit "in a few hours."

The Calmness Agreement Report - Continued - The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

According to the Ha'aretz of 25/10/2008, President Shimon Peres endorsed on Thursday 23/11/2008 the spirit of a broad Arab Peace Initiative (API), as an opportunity that could bring peace to the Middle East, speaking at a meeting with Egypt's President in Sharm el-Sheikh.

It was the first time Peres spoke in an Arab country in support of the long-stalled initiative, adding significance to his remarks, such as to negotiate on the API.

The Egyptian President Mubarak commented that the API doesn’t need negotiating over its contents, so Israel should agree on it to start the process.

Peres' remarks also marked another step in his recent efforts to jump-start a 2002 Saudi proposal for comprehensive peace in the region. One week before the statement of President Peres, IDF defense minister Barak made a similar statement urging his government to agree on the API (where he called it the Saudi initiative), as a good base for the peace negotiations with The Arab World, in order to achieve peace in the region. He also stated that the Israeli government was satisfied about the Calmness in Gaza, and hoped to extend it on the West Bank.

Israeli leaders were seriously considering a dormant Saudi plan offering a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab world in exchange for lands captured during the 1967 war, Defense Minister Ehud Barak said. He also stated that it may be time to pursue an overall peace deal for the region since individual negotiations with Syria and the Palestinians showed little progress.

Barak said he had discussed the Saudi plan with prime minister-designate Tzipi Livni, and that Israel was considering a response. Saudi Arabia first proposed the peace initiative in 2002, offering pan-Arab recognition of Israel in exchange for Israel's withdrawal to the pre-1967 border.

The 22-member Arab League endorsed the plan last year. The Israeli government had in the past described the plan as a good basis for discussion, but expressed some reservations. There should definitely be room to introduce a comprehensive Israeli plan to counter the Saudi plan that would be the basis for a discussion on overall regional peace, Barak told Army Radio. He noted the deep, joint interest with moderate Arab leaders in containing Iran's nuclear ambitions and limiting the influence of Hezbollah and Hamas.

Analyst Ghassan Khatib, a former Palestinian minister, said that although the Israeli interest in the six-year-old plan was a little bit late, the plan was still valid and indeed offered the most promising potential way forward.

While outgoing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had welcomed the Saudi plan, he and other leaders wanted to keep small parts of the territories captured in 1967. Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat noted that pursuing the Saudi peace initiative did not necessarily undermine the direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians and he encouraged Israel to pursue this track. "I think Israel should have done this since 2002. It is the most strategic initiative that came from the Arab world since 1948," he said.

On 1/12/2008 the “Haaretz Israeli newspaper” reported that the European Union prepared a document in preparation for Barack Obama when he is taking over as the President of United States on 20/1/2009. The document included the path of the peace process during the next year, and also it called for pressure on Israel to reopen Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem, including the Orient House . This document was to be presented to the foreign ministers of the European Union, to be held a week later, during the presence of 27 of the Foreign Affairs Ministers.

The document assured that the EU should encourage the new US President Barack Obama to maintain the continued US involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, so both the EU and US must therefore strengthen their communication and relations to achieve this goal. It was also found important to improve the role of the international community, in order to implement the first phase of the Roadmap, with an emphasis on a complete halt of the construction of settlements and the removal of military checkpoints. The Palestinians were urged to fight terrorism.

According to the document, in 2009, the European Union intended to work on three tracks:

First: the Jerusalem issue; The description of one capital city for two nations is a key to the establishment of a Palestinian state. The EU is to work intensively for the reopening of the Orient House and other Palestinian institutions closed by Israel.

Second : the security issue; The European Union expresses its readiness to participate effectively in security arrangements for the final solution, including the dispatch of police, soldiers and European civilians in the West Bank in order to increase the training of Palestinian security forces, and furthermore monitor the implementation of the agreement.

A third trend: The refugees issue; In the EU plan, the need for a "realistic and fair" solution is identified. In this context the European Union is preparing to establish an organization or an international mechanism to compensate and rehabilitate the refugees in coordination with Israel and the Palestinians.

The document praised the efforts of the Palestinian Authority for maintaining security and said that the PA had carried out many steps in the direction of improving the security situation in the West Bank. So, Israel must hand over security authority in large parts of the West Bank and the PA must expand the presence of Palestinian security forces outside the cities during 2009.

The European Union expects Israel to freeze construction in settlements, also where it concerns the expansion of the natural growing purposes, including East Jerusalem.

The document, devised by the French Foreign Ministry, concluded with emphasizing that the EU would send a clear message to Israel regarding the settlements and would discuss other ways to influence Israel, including the issue of boycotting goods exported from the settlements.

In the meantime (specifically at a meeting on 9/12/2008), the EU had started a new era of establishing more tight and strategic relations with Israel. Although the decisions made, talked about the Israeli violations of human rights in the Palestinian Occupied Territories and about the closure of the Gaza Strip, the EU adopted a very unconditional number of serious decisions regarding the relations with Israel.

1. From then on there would be Israeli-European Periodical summits;

2. Three meetings would be held each year between the European foreign ministers with the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs;

3. Israel would from then on be invited to participate in the EU organized humanitarian missions that were relevant to Israel;

4. Israel would be invited to the EU security meetings.

Despite the fact that the decision began with mentioning the need for Israel to end any violations of Human Rights and to end the occupation, the four decisions were not made conditional to Israeli actions concerning the peace process or ending the occupation - a matter that made the Palestinian Prime-Minister Salam Fayyad severely criticize the EU.

Barak Ravid wrote in Ha’aretz on 6/12/2008 that Israeli officials were deeply concerned over an internal European Union document outlining the EU's plans for advancing an Israeli-Palestinian deal in 2009. Inter-alia, it called for increased pressure on Israel to reopen Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem, including the Orient House, which formerly served as the Palestinian Authority's headquarters in the city.

The document, a copy of which was obtained by Ha’aretz, was written by the French Foreign Ministry, as France at the time occupied the EU's rotating presidency.

It was slated to be discussed a week later at a meeting of the EU's foreign ministers, and Israel was trying to get various elements changed before then.

Titled "The EU Action Strategy for Peace in the Middle East: The Way Forward," the document proposed various steps the EU should take in 2009 on both the Palestinian and the Syrian tracks, with emphasis on the former. However, its proposals were liable to result in a clash with whatever new government Israelis would elect in February, whether headed by Tzipi Livni or Benjamin Netanyahu.

The EU, it stated, must encourage the newly elected American government to be actively engaged in Israeli-Palestinian talks. In addition, the document states, the international community must closely monitor the implementation of the first stage of the road map peace plan, which required Israel to freeze settlement construction and remove West Bank roadblocks, and the PA to fight terror.

Regarding the so-called core issues of the conflict - borders, security, Jerusalem and refugees - the document proposed three main lines of action, which have already been described above.

The Calmness Agreement Report - Continued - Hamas and Arab / International relations

Palestinians - Hamas and Arab /International relations

No country (including Arab Countries) recognized the Hamas regime in Gaza, except for Iran, which doesn’t recognize the regime but is the only country supporting Hamas with arms and finance.

On 15/7/2008 Tony Blair, delegate of the Quartet, arrived at the borders of Gaza on the Israeli side of the Erez border crossing, while he intended to inaugurate the second phase of the Sewage Treatment Project in the northern part of Gaza Strip. However, he was forced to cancel his visit, because, so reported Israeli sources, of a plan to assassinate him and also due to the presence of large numbers of Hamas security personnel, belonging to the deposed government.

It was believed that the visit was canceled because of political reasons, especially because Hamas had taken advantage of such a visit before, by claiming its success in the security issues under its regime, especially in light of Calmness.

Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri on the same day (15/7/2008) accused Israel and others (mainly the PA) to undermine the visit, as a continuation of the war against Hamas. Prime Minister of the deposed government Ismail Haniya also stated on that day that the visit would have been as a result of the improvement of the security situation in the Gaza Strip under the Hamas regime. He described Gaza as an oasis of safety and security (before the cancellation of the visit) but, after the cancellation of the visit, he also claimed an Israeli plot against Hamas to prevent them taking advantage of the visit as a political achievement.

In their ME report No.24 on 11/9/2008 The International Crisis Group(ICG) wrote :
“Since Hamas’s June 2007 takeover of Gaza, the US, Israel, several Arab states and elements within the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Fatah have been counting on a strategy of weakening Hamas by isolating Gaza. That approach lies in tatters. The Islamist movement has scored a series of significant tactical victories. Internally, it has improved security and marginalized political challengers. It has reshaped the bureaucracy and pushed out those still loyal to the Ramallah-based government. Externally, it concluded a ceasefire with Israel, which is shaky but still holding. Hamas is developing its ties with outside actors, most recently Jordan.”

In an unexpected event on 23 August 2008, two small boats, the SS Free Gaza and the SS Liberty, successfully landed in Gaza in the evening, breaking the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip with 44 peace activists on board from 17 countries after spending 2 days at sea, coming from Cyprus. It was a complete surprise that the Israeli Government allowed the 2 boats to land at the Gaza shore after being threatened by Israel that they wouldn't be able to do so.

After 5 days in Gaza, 34 of the activists left Gaza, having with them a boy who lost his leg during military clashes to be treated in Cyprus, and a family who were stuck in Gaza (a mother and her children). One of the activists, being Israeli, got arrested when arriving at the Erez border crossing, while neither Israel nor Egypt accepted to give the rest of the 9 activists permission to return to their countries through their lands.

On 20/9/2008 Egypt permitted only Lorine Both (sister of Tony Blair’s wife) to leave when reopening the Rafah border crossing for students and humanitarian cases.

The Palestinian International Campaign to End the Siege on Gaza, announced that the Free Gaza Movement had informed them that another boat, the SS Hope (Al-Amal), planned to depart from Larnaca, Cyprus on 24 September, but the organizers postponed its departure for unknown reasons.
The passengers in the boat included:
- Five physicians from four countries
- Human rights lawyers and monitors
- Mr. Jamal Zahalkeh – Palestinian member of the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset).
- Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi, – General Secretary of the Palestinian National Initiative, and member of the Palestinian Legislative Council.
- Ms. Mairead Maguire – 1976 Nobel Peace Prize winner from Belfast, Ireland.

On 1/12/2008, very early in the morning, Israeli Coast Guard ships prevented a Libyan ship "AlMarwa" loaded with about 2000 tons of foodstuffs and medical supplies to land at the Gaza sea port. The AlMarwa continued its way to Al-Arish, an Egyptian sea port, to unload its cargo, so it could be transported to Gaza by land.

On 7/12/2008 the Israeli Authorities stopped a sailing boat from Jaffa Israeli port, on a trip that was organized by Knesset members, as well as Israeli Arab politicians and human rights activists. The boat was loaded with 5 tons of humanitarian assistance to Gaza's people. The Israeli security services also confiscated the materials on the boat.

On 9/12/2008 a new small boat Al-Karama (Dignity) had arrived from Cyprus at Gaza sea port, with 12 pro-Palestinian activists on board, and a symbolic amount of medicines, breaching the Israeli blockade on Gaza strip. The boat returned back with 11 Palestinian students, who were to join universities abroad. The Free Gaza website wrote that Palestinians were also expecting 2 big ships loaded with foodstuffs as well as medicines for Gaza to sail from London.

PLC member Mr. Jamal Khoudary (Head of the popular committee against the siege), stated on www.freegaza.ps (on 3/12/2008) that the Islamic Parliaments Union intended to send a ship loaded with humanitarian support to sail from Larnaka on Cyprus on 18/12/2008, to be followed by a Jordanian ship to sail from Aqaba sea port on 20/12/2008. He also added that Kuwait and Yemen promised to send 2 ships on January 2009 to break through the closure of the besieged Gaza Strip.

The Calmness Agreement Report - Conclusions

Conclusions

The Calmness Agreement was agreed upon between Hamas and Israel for the best of each party.

· Israel wanted to stop the anger of the citizens in southern Israel who began to demonstrate against their government, which started to lose popularity, and to save the huge budgets required to reinforce thousands of houses against Hamas rockets.

· Israel aimed to have a peaceful period during the political negotiations with PA President Mahmoud Abbas, and on the other hand to negotiate with Hamas through Egypt to free it’s captive soldier.

· Israel was not able to finalize the peaceful negotiations with the PA due to a change in leadership, as a result of the Israeli Police investigations and interrogations with PM Ehud Olmert. He was accused of being corrupt in at least 3 cases. This will last for a long time when the new Kadima leader Tzipi Levni proves unable form a coalition, which means that Ihud Olmert will remain as a transition PM and new elections in Israel to take place on February 10^th 2009.

· The Israeli government seemed not ready to start a full invasion of Gaza Strip, so it needed some time to improve protection of the Israeli people in the south from rockets, taking into consideration that some Israeli officials, such as Brigadier General Yossi Bidts (Head of the Research Division of Israeli Intelligence) as well as the vice PM Haim Ramon, Tzipi Livni, Eli Ishay, and other Israel leaders from the opposition were against the Calmness Agreement.

Haim Ramon (Vice Israeli PM), declared on 31/11/2008 that Israel had saved the Hamas regime from falling, when it agreed on the Calmness Agreement on 19/6/2008.

· Israel had benefited politically from the Calmness Agreement and the closure imposed on the Gaza Strip by pushing the Gazans toward Egypt and to consider Gaza Strip as The Palestinian State, by cutting all lines and relations between Gaza and the West Bank. The latter would remain under Israeli sovereignty, cutting the West Bank into 4-5 Palestinian self-rule areas for an unlimited period of time. So Israel wanted Egypt to open the Rafah border crossing under their conditions, and would even encourage a naval line between Gaza and Cyprus.

· Israel benefited from the Calmness Agreement, while it could accelerate the building in settlements, especially in East Jerusalem, where the number of new houses on which construction had been started since Annapolis (November 2007) was approximately 4500. Israel did not expect any negative reaction to come from Gaza due to the Calmness Agreement, but on the other hand, however, Palestinian Arabs, who are Israeli citizens, started to act against Israel from an individual, nationalist point of view, due to the oppression they and their fellow Palestinians feel in the West Bank and Gaza, in addition to the discrimination they face from the Israeli authorities as “second grade Israeli citizens”.

· The Hamas regime in Gaza aimed to stop the Israeli attacks and aggressions on Gaza Strip and also the continuous closure of border crossings, which began to harm the movement and its popularity among the Palestinians in Gaza. It could be said that Hamas succeeded to fully control Gaza, using extreme and excessive force against its opponents, however, they still face a deteriorating economic situation.

· After arresting most of the Fatah leaders and initiating raids against 2 big clans in Gaza, the Hilles and Doghmosh, Hamas considered Gaza as its own security zone. Hamas continued to threaten other families and groups (including Fatah), in order to keep them from taking any military or other action against the new ruler of Gaza.

· Hamas still considered a full Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip a possibility, even after the exchange of prisoners and freeing the Israeli captive soldier, so Hamas needed time to reinforce its military arsenal and training, especially when a new leadership was to be installed in Israel.

· Hamas had been looking to support its regime in Gaza, and for more recognition from Arabs as well as the rest of the international community. Hamas politicians looked for reconciliation with the Jordanian regime, and looked also for more support from the international community to support Hamas, in order to put an end to the closure of Gaza. This would give Hamas more power and popularity if, and when, negotiating with Fatah for reconciliation.

· Hamas wanted to gain more time for the internal dialogue with Fatah, and enforce its conditions, as Hamas made it clear that it will delegitimize President Mahmoud Abbas after 9/1/2009. So Hamas wanted to reach that date and appoint a new Hamas President, in case there would not be Palestinian consensus on early presidential and PLC elections. Hamas rejected early elections for the PLC, and wanted to apply the Basic Law in order to appoint Dr. Ahmed Bahar as the new PA president after 9/1/2008. (According to the Palestinian Constitution the PLC Chairman can substitute the President in 3 cases - resignation, death, and the loss of capability.) In case the 9^th of January would see no dialogue or reconciliation, the gap between the two Palestinian regimes in Gaza and West Bank would become wider, and by then talking about reconciliation would be an illusion.

· In case dialogue and reconciliation would fail, the PA was considering PA reunification, using force against Hamas, but in full cooperation with Israel, Jordan and Egypt, as declared by the Palestinian Chief of staff Gen. Dhiab Al-Ali (Haaretz 21/9/2008).

· Arab countries as well as the Arab League showed more interest and determination in solving the Palestinian internal conflict, especially before 9/1/2009, including the proposal of sending Arab forces to Gaza, and isolating Hamas completely by Arab countries in case it would refuse the Arab initiative for reconciliation. On the other hand, Israel threatened PA President Mahmoud Abbas (during the meeting held between PM Ehud Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas on 16/9/2008) that Israel would consider closing all Gaza border crossings, and stopping all types of negotiations with PA in case the PA would carry out any negotiations and reconciliation with Hamas.

· President Mahmoud Abbas seemed pessimistic, as he declared to Haaretz on 12/9/2008, that there will be no peace treaty signed with Israel by the end of 2008. This gave Hamas more powerful leverage when negotiating reconciliation with Fatah.

· U.S. President George W. Bush prepared a document to bridge the gap in attitudes between the Palestinian Authority and the Jewish State in all outstanding matters between both of them. This document would be acceptable to the new US President, who’ll begin exercising his duties on January 20, 2009). The Israeli newspaper Ma’areev (25/9/2008), citing high-level political sources in Tel Aviv, said that the Israeli government delivered a document containing the security arrangements demanded by Israel for any lasting political settlement to the conflict with the Palestinians.

· The Calmness didn’t produce at all what the two parties were looking for. The Israeli/ Hamas indirect negotiations for freeing the Israeli captive soldier remained without progress, Israel didn’t fulfill the conditions of the Calmness, increasing the quantities and number of types of goods transported to Gaza and fully reopening the border crossings with Gaza, including Rafah. Furthermore, rockets were still fired at Israeli cities and towns,

· On 17/9/2008, the Kadima party in Israel elected Tzipi Livni to be the new PM in Israel, in case she could form a new coalition. Livni, during her meetings and interviews, increasingly showed more extremism to satisfy the right wing in Israel. It is assumed that the Kadima party will demonstrate harsh and hard actions against Palestinians under the new leader Livni within the coming transition period, as an introduction to the coming elections in Israel, which will take place early next year (February 10^th 2009).

In this case things will have unknown consequences, whether for the Calmness Agreement, the exchange of prisoners, a possible Gaza invasion, or the peace negotiations, taking into consideration that Olmert will continue being a transition PM until the results of the elections and the formation of new government in Israel.

· Both Israel and Hamas are on edge during the period after the expiration of the Calmness Agreement, which terminated on 19/12/2008.

· Islamic Jihad as well as Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine showed no satisfaction with the Calmness Agreement, and both were asking to end it due to the Israeli violations and the deadlock position regarding the border crossings and goods transported to Gaza. PFLP made a press statement on 27/10/2008, in which one of the PFLP leaders (Dr. Rabah Muhanna) asked his fighters to be ready to resist against Israel as they stopped believing in the Calmness Agreement.

· October and November 2008 were considered a very crucial period as on 9/10/2008 PA president Mahmoud Abbas should have declared new presidential elections (three months before the end of his period), and in November were the elections of the new US President. In addition to this, during this period the Arab Countries should have a real plan for Palestinian reconciliation, or pointing out which party (Hamas or Fatah) was ruining the effort to end the Palestinian conflict. Actually, the meeting in Cairo for dialogue and reconciliation was canceled when Hamas refused to join it on 11/11/2008.

· Hamas was asking for new conditions to extend the Calmness with Israel, mainly to force Israel to agree on the basic conditions made by Hamas when they agreed on the Calmness Agreement earlier, on 19/6/2008.

· There were great doubts whether the Calmness Agreement could be extended when the exchange of prisoners between Hamas and Israel remained in a deadlock position.