The Calmness Agreement was agreed upon between Hamas and Israel for the best of each party.
· Israel wanted to stop the anger of the citizens in southern Israel who began to demonstrate against their government, which started to lose popularity, and to save the huge budgets required to reinforce thousands of houses against Hamas rockets.
· Israel aimed to have a peaceful period during the political negotiations with PA President Mahmoud Abbas, and on the other hand to negotiate with Hamas through Egypt to free it’s captive soldier.
· Israel was not able to finalize the peaceful negotiations with the PA due to a change in leadership, as a result of the Israeli Police investigations and interrogations with PM Ehud Olmert. He was accused of being corrupt in at least 3 cases. This will last for a long time when the new Kadima leader Tzipi Levni proves unable form a coalition, which means that Ihud Olmert will remain as a transition PM and new elections in Israel to take place on February 10th 2009.
· The Israeli government seemed not ready to start a full invasion of Gaza Strip, so it needed some time to improve protection of the Israeli people in the south from rockets, taking into consideration that some Israeli officials, such as Brigadier General Yossi Bidts (Head of the Research Division of Israeli Intelligence) as well as the vice PM Haim Ramon, Tzipi Livni, Eli Ishay, and other Israel leaders from the opposition were against the Calmness Agreement.
Haim Ramon (Vice Israeli PM), declared on 31/11/2008 that Israel had saved the Hamas regime from falling, when it agreed on the Calmness Agreement on 19/6/2008.
· Israel had benefited politically from the Calmness Agreement and the closure imposed on the Gaza Strip by pushing the Gazans toward Egypt and to consider Gaza Strip as The Palestinian State, by cutting all lines and relations between Gaza and the West Bank. The latter would remain under Israeli sovereignty, cutting the West Bank into 4-5 Palestinian self-rule areas for an unlimited period of time. So Israel wanted Egypt to open the Rafah border crossing under their conditions, and would even encourage a naval line between Gaza and Cyprus.
· Israel benefited from the Calmness Agreement, while it could accelerate the building in settlements, especially in East Jerusalem, where the number of new houses on which construction had been started since Annapolis (November 2007) was approximately 4500. Israel did not expect any negative reaction to come from Gaza due to the Calmness Agreement, but on the other hand, however, Palestinian Arabs, who are Israeli citizens, started to act against Israel from an individual, nationalist point of view, due to the oppression they and their fellow Palestinians feel in the West Bank and Gaza, in addition to the discrimination they face from the Israeli authorities as “second grade Israeli citizens”.
· The Hamas regime in Gaza aimed to stop the Israeli attacks and aggressions on Gaza Strip and also the continuous closure of border crossings, which began to harm the movement and its popularity among the Palestinians in Gaza. It could be said that Hamas succeeded to fully control Gaza, using extreme and excessive force against its opponents, however, they still face a deteriorating economic situation.
· After arresting most of the Fatah leaders and initiating raids against 2 big clans in Gaza, the Hilles and Doghmosh, Hamas considered Gaza as its own security zone. Hamas continued to threaten other families and groups (including Fatah), in order to keep them from taking any military or other action against the new ruler of Gaza.
· Hamas still considered a full Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip a possibility, even after the exchange of prisoners and freeing the Israeli captive soldier, so Hamas needed time to reinforce its military arsenal and training, especially when a new leadership was to be installed in Israel.
· Hamas had been looking to support its regime in Gaza, and for more recognition from Arabs as well as the rest of the international community. Hamas politicians looked for reconciliation with the Jordanian regime, and looked also for more support from the international community to support Hamas, in order to put an end to the closure of Gaza. This would give Hamas more power and popularity if, and when, negotiating with Fatah for reconciliation.
· Hamas wanted to gain more time for the internal dialogue with Fatah, and enforce its conditions, as Hamas made it clear that it will delegitimize President Mahmoud Abbas after 9/1/2009. So Hamas wanted to reach that date and appoint a new Hamas President, in case there would not be Palestinian consensus on early presidential and PLC elections. Hamas rejected early elections for the PLC, and wanted to apply the Basic Law in order to appoint Dr. Ahmed Bahar as the new PA president after 9/1/2008. (According to the Palestinian Constitution the PLC Chairman can substitute the President in 3 cases - resignation, death, and the loss of capability.) In case the 9th of January would see no dialogue or reconciliation, the gap between the two Palestinian regimes in Gaza and West Bank would become wider, and by then talking about reconciliation would be an illusion.
· In case dialogue and reconciliation would fail, the PA was considering PA reunification, using force against Hamas, but in full cooperation with Israel, Jordan and Egypt, as declared by the Palestinian Chief of staff Gen. Dhiab Al-Ali (Haaretz 21/9/2008).
· Arab countries as well as the Arab League showed more interest and determination in solving the Palestinian internal conflict, especially before 9/1/2009, including the proposal of sending Arab forces to Gaza, and isolating Hamas completely by Arab countries in case it would refuse the Arab initiative for reconciliation. On the other hand, Israel threatened PA President Mahmoud Abbas (during the meeting held between PM Ehud Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas on 16/9/2008) that Israel would consider closing all Gaza border crossings, and stopping all types of negotiations with PA in case the PA would carry out any negotiations and reconciliation with Hamas.
· President Mahmoud Abbas seemed pessimistic, as he declared to Haaretz on 12/9/2008, that there will be no peace treaty signed with Israel by the end of 2008. This gave Hamas more powerful leverage when negotiating reconciliation with Fatah.
· U.S. President George W. Bush prepared a document to bridge the gap in attitudes between the Palestinian Authority and the Jewish State in all outstanding matters between both of them. This document would be acceptable to the new US President, who’ll begin exercising his duties on January 20, 2009). The Israeli newspaper Ma’areev (25/9/2008), citing high-level political sources in Tel Aviv, said that the Israeli government delivered a document containing the security arrangements demanded by Israel for any lasting political settlement to the conflict with the Palestinians.
· The Calmness didn’t produce at all what the two parties were looking for. The Israeli/ Hamas indirect negotiations for freeing the Israeli captive soldier remained without progress, Israel didn’t fulfill the conditions of the Calmness, increasing the quantities and number of types of goods transported to Gaza and fully reopening the border crossings with Gaza, including Rafah. Furthermore, rockets were still fired at Israeli cities and towns,
· On 17/9/2008, the Kadima party in Israel elected Tzipi Livni to be the new PM in Israel, in case she could form a new coalition. Livni, during her meetings and interviews, increasingly showed more extremism to satisfy the right wing in Israel. It is assumed that the Kadima party will demonstrate harsh and hard actions against Palestinians under the new leader Livni within the coming transition period, as an introduction to the coming elections in Israel, which will take place early next year (February 10th 2009).
In this case things will have unknown consequences, whether for the Calmness Agreement, the exchange of prisoners, a possible Gaza invasion, or the peace negotiations, taking into consideration that Olmert will continue being a transition PM until the results of the elections and the formation of new government in Israel.
· Both Israel and Hamas are on edge during the period after the expiration of the Calmness Agreement, which terminated on 19/12/2008.
· Islamic Jihad as well as Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine showed no satisfaction with the Calmness Agreement, and both were asking to end it due to the Israeli violations and the deadlock position regarding the border crossings and goods transported to Gaza. PFLP made a press statement on 27/10/2008, in which one of the PFLP leaders (Dr. Rabah Muhanna) asked his fighters to be ready to resist against Israel as they stopped believing in the Calmness Agreement.
· October and November 2008 were considered a very crucial period as on 9/10/2008 PA president Mahmoud Abbas should have declared new presidential elections (three months before the end of his period), and in November were the elections of the new US President. In addition to this, during this period the Arab Countries should have a real plan for Palestinian reconciliation, or pointing out which party (Hamas or Fatah) was ruining the effort to end the Palestinian conflict. Actually, the meeting in Cairo for dialogue and reconciliation was canceled when Hamas refused to join it on 11/11/2008.
· Hamas was asking for new conditions to extend the Calmness with Israel, mainly to force Israel to agree on the basic conditions made by Hamas when they agreed on the Calmness Agreement earlier, on 19/6/2008.
· There were great doubts whether the Calmness Agreement could be extended when the exchange of prisoners between Hamas and Israel remained in a deadlock position.
